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Abstract
W e introd uce an analytical fram ew ork close to th e canonical m od el of p lat-
form com p etition investigated by R och et and T irole (2006) to stud y p ricing
d ecisions in tw o-sid ed m arkets w h en tw o or m ore p latform s are need ed sim ul-
taneously for th e successful com p letion of a transaction. T h e m od el d evelop ed
is a natural extension of th e C ournot-E llet th eory of com p lem entary m ono-
p oly featuring clear cut asym m etric single- and m ultih om ing p atterns across
th e m arket. T h e results ind icate th at th e so-called anticom m ons p rob lem ge-
neralizes to tw o-sid ed m arkets b ecause ind ivid ual p latform s d o not take into
account th e negative p ricing externality th ey exert on th e oth er p latform s.
A s a result, m ergers b etw een such p latform s m ay b e w elfare enh ancing, b ut
involve red istrib ution of surp lus from one sid e of th e m arket to th e oth er.
M oreover, th e lim it of an atom istic allocation of p rop erty rights h ow ever is
not m onop oly p ricing, ind icating th at th ere also exist d i erences w ith th e re-
ceived th eory of com p lem entarity.
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Cournot (1838, 1971) was the rst to investigate a market structure in which two
p rod ucers have a monop oly on good s that are comp lements in the p rod uction of a
third comp osite good . T he striking conclusion of Cournot's comp lementary mono-
p oly theory is that welfare in this p articular ind ustry d ecreases with the numb er of
ind ivid ual p rod ucers, a result also known as the anticommons p rob lem.1
W hereas the p rob lem of the commons stems from inad equately d ened p rop erty
rights,2 the p rob lem of the anticommons is exactly op p osite: the negative externality
results from too many ind ivid ual owners, who in their p ricing d ecision d o not take
into account their imp act on total d emand , see H eller (1998) and B uchanan and
Y oon (2000).
W ith this in mind , consid er markets where e ective communication is comp osite
by nature in that it can only b e p rod uced by simultaneously conveying information
to d i erent agents. T his would b e the case if each agent in the market need s to b e
aware of a p articular alternative's existence in ord er for that alternative to stand
a chance of b eing chosen. T o the extent that each agent uses his own channel to
acquire this information, these channels are comp lements.
F or examp le, if a tour op erator wants to p romote and sella new d estination as the
id ealtrip for the entire family to sp end a holid ay, he need s to send this information to
all the d ecision makers in a household , imp lying the use of d i erent comp lementary
information channels. If the tour op erator in some way communicated the exquisite
features of this d estination to b oth p arents b ut forgot to inform the ad olescent
child ren, there is a d istinct p ossib ility that the p rop osed d estination will not b e the
one withheld by the family as a whole, and hence that it will not b e chosen as the
next holid ay d estination.
T he recent theory of two-sid ed markets (see e.g A rmstrong, 2006; Parker and
V an A lstyne, 2005; R ochet and T irole, 2003, 2006), ap p roaches information and
communication channels as p latforms connecting two d istinct sid es of a market. O n
one sid e of the market, there is a group of consumers who wants to get informed .
T hey b uy a magazine to nd out ab out their eld of interest. T his is the magazine's
read ership and constitutes the \target group " to p rod ucers located on the other sid e
of the market. T his sid e of the market wants to \get information across," and d oes
so by b uying ad vertising sp ace in the magazines. A s we will d eal with ap p lications
1Cournot's ndings with respect to the pricing of complementary goods by monopolists each
providing a component are dual to his results on the quantity decisions taken by oligopolists in
the presence of a Walrasian auctioneer, as shown by Sonnenschein (1968).
2See Gordon (1954), Scott (1955) and Hardin (1968) for the original contributions on the
commons problem and Gibbons (1992) for an illuminating game-theoretic analysis.
1other than newspapers and magazines later on, we will refer to the reader and
advertiser sides of the market as \receivers" (consumers) and \senders" (producers)
respectively.
A prominent research question in the two-sided markets literature addresses
agents' single- and multihoming patterns. M uch in the spirit of the chicken-and-egg
problem that underlies the business model of platforms, one can raise two oppos-
ing arguments with respect to the localization of these patterns. The rst states
that one side of the market singlehomes because of preferences or tastes, and hence
that the other side has to consider multihoming, thus explaining why competing
platforms are sometimes used simultaneously (S ee Rochet and Tirole, 2003, S ection
3).
Conversely, our paper deals with examples where the platforms are complements
by necessity due to technical, biological, cultural or legal reasons,3 forcing one side
(senders) to multihome. As a consequence the receiver side rationally will single-
home. This kind of complementarity therefore constitutes a necessary and su -
cient condition for explaining asymmetric single-and multihoming patterns across
the market, i.e., why one side of the market singlehomes, together with complete
multihoming on the other side. Since this approach is novel yet quite prominently
present in reality, w e dedicate e ort to illustrate and argument the complementarity
of platforms.
The paper's main contribution however aims to illustrate the implications of
platform complementarity on platform pricing structures. A number of interesting
research questions arise: is complementarity benecial to the sender (multihom-
ing) or receiver (singlehoming) side? What about mergers between complementary
platforms? (Can Cournot's results be extended to two-sided markets?) D oes ex-
treme fragmentation of property rights induce monopoly outcomes in the presence
of complementary platforms?
As such, the model developed in this paper lies at the crossroads of two important
strands in the economic literature, borrowing elements and combining insights from
(i) the two-sided markets literature (see e.g Armstrong, 2006; Parker and Van Al-
styne, 2005; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006), and (ii) the theory on complementary
goods (see e.g. Cournot, 1838, 1971; E llet, 1839, 1966; E conomides and S alop, 1992;
G audet and S alant, 1992; Feinberg and K amien, 2001).
M any modern network industries feature both complementarity and two-sided-
ness, and as such three studies are related to our analysis. First, Carrillo and Tan
3Another source of complementarity could be political: if the decision-making process requires
unanimity, all voters have to be convinced, for example all family members in choosing the holiday
destination in the tour operator's example.
2(2006) study consumers' single- or multihoming decisions in a setting where third
parties oer goods and services that are complementary to the ones provided by
two competing horizontally dierentiated platforms. Whereas their focus lies on
the impact of platform dierentiation and the number of complementors on plat-
form pricing structures, our paper| while simultaneously providing an explanation
for asymmetric \homing" patterns| stresses the impact of platform complementa-
rity on the pricing structure. We do so by comparing ensuing prices and prots
under dierent platform ownership structures, taking our cue from the theory on
complementary goods.
Second, and related to Carrillo and Tan (2006), Economides and Katsamakas
(2006) tackle the same issue of the optimal two-sided pricing strategy but from the
point of view of proprietary versus open source platforms. Our paper shares their
framework of analysis in the presence of dierent industry structures. However, while
these authors consider vertical integration between platforms and complements, our
model emphasizes horizontal integration between complementary platforms.
Still another perspective is taken by Doganoglu and Wright (2006), studying
the in uence of consumer multihoming on compatibility decisions by rms. At the
heart of their analysis lies the observation that although compatibility between rms
increases consumers' network benets, these can also be obtained when consumers
choose to multihome should rms decide to remain incompatible. In our model, plat-
form complementarity assures that singlehoming consumers (receivers) fully realize
cross-market network benets.
To shed light on the aforementioned issues, this paper is structured as follows:
in Section 2 we further elaborate on the complementarity of platforms by examining
a number of mini case studies that have been chosen because of policy relevance, as
well as their illustrative nature with respect to the complementarity of platforms.
Section 3 introduces the model we use to investigate pricing decisions by comple-
mentary platforms in two-sided markets and presents the basic results. Among other
things, we show that the problem of the anticommons extends to two-sided mar-
kets, but not in a symmetric way. Reducing the number of independent platforms
increases social welfare (with redistribution of wealth), but increasing the number
of players does not destroy all sender surplus by convergence to the monopoly price.
Section 4 generalizes the setting to include the analysis of pricing behavior by bun-
dles composed of one- and two-sided components. This encompasses as special cases
both Cournot's initial approach and the present model. Section 5 concludes.
3Figure 1: Generalized industry conguration
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2 On the Complementarity of Platforms
In this section we document three cases in which the prevailing business models of the
industry are well captured by a model of complementary platforms. The discussion
always proceeds along the same lines: rst we provide some stylized facts that are
relevant to the industry under consideration. N ext we indicate why its two-sided
nature is important and what explains for the complementarity of the providers.
Given the latter, it follows that one side of the market (fully) multihomes, whereas
for the other side it then becomes rational to singlehome.
As an example, consider Figure 1 depicting the generalized industry conguration
where a range of complementary platforms serve two distinct sides of the same
market, senders and receivers respectively.4 In particular, note that while each
platform serves its own segment of receivers (singlehoming), it simultaneously serves
many senders who are forced to multihome in order to reach cross-market agents
eectively. As a result, for a single transaction senders pay the sum of prices of all
platforms present in the market, as opposed to the receivers who pay a single fee to
the platform they exclusively patronize.
4In Figure 1 the arrows emanate from the price-setting entity.
42.1 Financial and Legal Advertising in a Multilinguistic Coun-
try
On December 20, 2005 the Belgian Antitrust Authority approved of a merger be-
tween the only two remaining nancial newspapers in the country, however not
without conducting lengthy further investigations and imposing restrictions.5 The
results of the present paper show why the merger was welfare enhancing and thus
should not have been delayed. Moreover, the conditions imposed hardly made sense
given the complementary nature of advertising in this particular market.
Following up on European Commission practice, see Recoletos/U nidesa and
Gruner and Jahr/Financial Times/JV,6 the Belgian Antitrust Authority partitioned
the market for advertising in three distinct submarkets: (1) the market for thematic
advertising, (2) the market for legal and nancial advertising, and nally (3) the
market for job advertisements, see Van Cayseele (2006). Especially the second mar-
ket is important for the particular merger that was proposed since it involved the
Dutch language nancial newspaper \De Tijd" and the French language nancial
newspaper \L 'Echo."
Reecting both historical and cultural dierences between the two major commu-
nities constituting Belgium, \De Tijd" and \L 'Echo" respectively cater for readers
in the Dutch-speaking part of the country, Flanders, situated in the North, and their
French-speaking counterparts in Wallonia, situated in the South. In the market for
legal and nancial advertising, each paper connects investors from a specic linguis-
tic regime with companies that want to convey \information," e.g., an announcement
for the general assembly to be held in the near future.7 As such, this particular mar-
ket is two-sided and newspapers act as platforms connecting cross-market agents.
To protect investors' interests, companies situated in Belgium|irrespective of their
regional origin|are required by law to publish their information in the dierent
languages, D utch and F rench.
Thus, in order to reach Dutch-speaking investors, companies place their an-
nouncements in \De Tijd" and simultaneously buy advertisement space in \L 'Echo"
to interact with French-speaking investors. From the point of view of the companies
both newspapers are necessary (and thus complementary) inputs into the provision
5See decision 2005{C/C{56 on cases CONC{C/C{03/050, N.V. Rossel & Cie/N.V. De Pers-
groep/N.V. Editeco, and MEDE{C/C{05/0068, N.V. Uitgeversbedrijf Tijd/N.V. Editeco.
6See respectively the European Commission decision of 1 February 1999 on case IV-M.1041,
Recoletos/Unidesa, Pb. 17 March 1999, C 73/06, and the decision of 20 April 1999 on case IV-
M.1455, Gruner and Jahr/Financial Times/JV, Pb. 31 August 1999, C 247/05.
7Related events are extra-ordinary meetings of the general assembly, with topics on the agenda
such as stock splits, raising capital, ...
5Figure 2: Belgian nancial newspapers
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of corporate information, forcing companies to multihome. Investors on the other
hand singlehome; they buy a single nancial newspaper and through its comple-
mentary nature, consequently stay informed on all companies' activities. Figure 2
provides a schematic overview of this particular industry setup.
The results presented in Section 3 indicate that the merger between \De Tijd"
and \L'Echo" actually increases welfare as measured by lower total prices and higher
industry prots. Hence, the condition imposed by the Belgian Antitrust Authority
so as to remedy the alleged negative consequences of the proposed merger did not
make sense as it prohibited discounts for joint advertising in \De Tijd" and other
newspapers belonging to the merged group, such as \L'Echo." This is particularly
the case because nancial and legal advertising was explicitly mentioned to be pre-
cluded from discounts for a combined advertisement. Moreover, we show that prices
on the receiver side are likely to increase post-merger, but often what readers pay
is subject to a price cap.
The complementary nature of newspaper and magazine advertising may well
reach far beyond the example of legal and  nancial messages in a multilinguistic
country. Besides the example of the tour operator who wants to sell a destination
to a family with unanimity voting, we may have a look at advertising by platforms
themselves. Considered separately, heterosexual dating clubs are platforms that
connect the two distinct sides of the market they operate in, namely single men and
single women. However, to advertise their activities to potential customers they rely
on the services of other platforms embodied by magazines that specically cater for
6Figure 3: Gender-biased magazines and heterosexual dating clubs
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the preferences of heterosexual men and women.
As such, these constitute two separate information channels through which dat-
ing clubs can reach agents on both sides of the market, see Figure 3. So, to the
extent that heterosexual single men are inclined to only read gender-biased maga-
zines (and similarly single women focus on one magazine), both sexes singlehome.
These gender-biased magazines then are complements whose advertising services
will need to be consumed as a bundle by dating clubs. As in the previous example,
the demand for platform services by dating clubs will be governed by the sum of
fees (total fee) charged by the platforms under consideration.
Compared to legal and nancial advertising in a multilinguistic country, the seg-
mentation of the groups in this case is not cultural (by language) but biological (by
sex), and, the cause of complementarity is not the law, but taste (heterosexual pref-
erences). The eect however is exactly the same: the advertisement services oered
by the gender-biased magazines are tied together in the same way the legal and
nancial advertising opportunities oered by the nancial newspapers are linked: as
complements.
2.2 Clearing Houses, Patent Pools, and Technology Licens-
ing
Clearing houses match technology suppliers with potential users. They can have a
very general approach providing a marketplace for a variety of technologies. Or they
7Figure 4: Patent pools and clearing houses
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can be specialized, well aware of the potential of a certain technology, and actively
searching for potential licensees, providing an array of su pporting services.8
In the present context, we focu s on the case of specialized clearing hou ses trying
to m atch the patentholders they represent with a variety of licensees. F rom their
specialized knowledge of the technology u nderlying the patent they will actively seek
for applications. A s a resu lt of these activities they collect paym ents from both sides
of the m arket, and hence can be m odeled as platform s. F igu re 4 provides a con gu -
ration of the econom ic relationship between patentholder and licensee m eeting over
a clearing hou se.
Innovations nowadays bu ild on a variety of patented inventions. T he resu lt is that
patents are com plem ents and the patentholders, when negotiating royalties, again
generate a negative pricing externality u pon each other. S hapiro (2001) showed in
a (one-sided) C ou rnot (com plem entary m onopoly) m odel that patent pools, com -
bining the ownership of the patents involved in the innovations, increase welfare.
S u bsequ ent research contribu tions by L erner and T irole (2004) have relaxed the
8An example of the former could be the internet marketplace yet2.com, an example of the
latter pharmalicensing.com. Interestingly, yet2.com's revenue structure is detailed on its w ebsite,
see http://www.yet2.com/app/about/usingsite: re ecting its tw o-sided nature revenue is gen-
erated from tw o activities, (1) searching for technology, a basic search tool w hich in an Adobe
R eader-style is free but can be upgraded at a cost, and (2) selling technology, w here costs depend
on the type of membership, e.g., from individuals, selling one technology at a time, to unlimited
annual listing memberships. T hey also charge a commission (w ith a minimum of $10.000) on every
technology transfer arrangement facilitated by its services.
8complementary feature of patents to allow patents to become substitutes as the
price of technology (license fees to be paid) for the innovations increases to the level
where \dropping" a patent from the bundle comes into consideration.
The model presented in this paper re-assumes perfect complementarity, but in
a two-sided context.9 The analysis shows that clearing houses, when allowed to act
as a pool, increase their prots and surplus to the end-users. This result thus shows
explicitly that pools facilitate the dissemination of inventions, yet at a price to the
patentholders. The net e ect of patent pools on the incentive to innovate therefore
is ambiguous: on the one hand the patent pool increases the number of end-users
and hence the amount of royalties paid, but on the other hand the patentees pay a
higher fee to the platform.
The patent pool problem shows that besides cultural or biological segmentation,
also technological specialization can be a source of segmentation. Technological
clearing houses specialize in certain technologies (biomedical, electronic, ...) and
a patent-holding innovator with a specic technology will o er his technology to
the market over that platform. O r there is specialization on the supply side of
technology, but on the demand side users need many complementary inventions
managed by several clearing houses, which therefore are complementary platforms.
2.3 Urban Location and Conglomeration
Another area of research where complementarity was stressed is the economics of
urban location, shopping malls and supermarkets, see Stahl (1987) and K lemperer
(1992). In this literature it is well recognized that the presence of one retail shop may
attract another, illustrating the complementarity between e.g. a grocery store, a fast-
food outlet and a pharmacy. It is also well-known that the higher individual shop
prices, the less attractive the overall shopping area becomes. E ven supermarkets in
a multi-stop shopping context face such pricing externality, see M anachotphong and
Smith (2007).
At the same time the externality across market sides has been noted as well,
and especially shopping malls are seen to be platforms that connect retailers with
consumers. As it is often the case in two-sided markets, one side of the market
9Undoubtedly, many examples exist in the context of combining several patented technologies
into one innovation, getting a new product on the market. A particular one which  ts the present
model well involves ultra high-speed cameras and ultra slow-motion image reproduction, see for
example i-movix' SprintCam which combines internally developed server technology with external
P hotron cameras. O ver 60% of the contracts the provider of the \recording technology" is involved
in, is in combination with the ultra-slow reproduction technology provider. B oth activities however
involve di erent technologies, covered by di erent patents. B ut the market for sports television
needs both, regardless whether it covers soccer, cycling, tennis, golf, ...
9Figure 5: Bundle with complementary one- and two-sided components
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is a loss leader and needs to be subsidized by the other side of the market, which
generates prots. For example, in shopping malls consumers get parking space for
free.
N othing however prevents other providers of complementary services trying to
become part of the new \agglomeration." The free parking space provided by the
shopping mall might convince car drivers to travel somewhat longer, which in turn
might attract a gas station to provide fuel. Typically, a gas station (or bus service) is
a one-sided component that links to the bundle, and this raises the question how the
price structure of the two-sided platform is aected by the inclusion of a one-sided
component. Figure 5 shows the industry structure when this happens.
Shopping malls certainly are not an isolated example of the presence of a one-
sided component in the bundle. Bundles can be made up by several one- and two-
sided components. As an example of the latter, consider large-scale amusement
parks and modern theme parks such as D isneyland. These resorts try to lure tourists
by oering them entertainment to be found nowhere else, ranging from adrenaline
soaked roller coaster rides to thematic shows, movies and performances. Connecting
tourists with performers and production houses (or even suppliers/manufacturers of
attractions) amusement parks can be considered as platforms in the market for
family-oriented entertainment.
N ext, consider the typical on site McD onald's at this very same D isneyland
resort. It connects hungry tourists with a specic desire to eat at McD onald's with
producers of fastfood menu ingredients (such as hamburgers, buns, ketchup, fries
10and soft drinks), all vying to secure contracts so as to become exclusive suppliers to
that fastfood chain. Together, Disneyland R esort and McDonald's are complements
to these visitors' theme park experience as a whole. The fact that the two platforms
mentioned here| Euro Disney and McDonald's| operate global purchasing centers
to deal with suppliers| which, once selected, will supply to the entire chain of outlets
of all players| serves to strengthen the complementary nature of this particular
industry.
Finally, consider the airline or railroad companies bringing tourists to Disney-
land. These are typically one-sided operators, but are as complementary as any of
the other two components. The current example can even be extended to include
hotel chains such as the Sheraton which can be added to the bundle should tourists
plan a prolonged stay at the amusement park.
As in the previous cases (see Subsections 2.1 and 2.2), some factors explain for
the segmentation of one side of the market while others for complementarity at the
other. H ere it is again specialization in production together with complementarity
in consumption that entails the industry conguration shown in Figure 1. W hile
complementarity beyond any doubt is less than perfect in the present case (Disney-
land visitors do not need to buy a hamburger on site or stay in a hotel while they
can drive their own car to get there), the implications for the pricing structure merit
close attention from the perspective of zoning laws. Often, these will conne eco-
nomic activity to the area of the shopping mall, limiting the number of complements
that are bundled at the same location.
3 The Model
Assume a market with platforms i = 1;:::;n exclusively providing their services
to two distinct sides of the market, referred to as senders and receivers. G iven the
discussion in Section 2 and without loss of generality, assume that the receiver side
of the market singlehomes, whereas the sender side multihomes. As such, senders
rely on the services of all n platforms; receivers on the other hand only need a single
platform to successfully complete their transactions. W e will refer to the charac-
teristic of receiver singlehoming and sender multihoming as the complementarity
assumption (CA).
Following the work by R ochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Bolt and Tieman







a transaction mediated by a specic platform i, with benets distributed according to
a probability density function gR
i and corresponding cumulative distribution function
11GR
i , and where 0 <  bR
i  1. Similarly, senders are heterogeneous in benets bS 2

0; bS
with probability density function gS and cumulative distribution function
GS, and 0 <  bS  1.
3.1 Complementary Platforms
We additionally state the following conditions:
(C1) \Eective" interaction between both sides of the market occurs between a
singleton sender and an n-tuple of receivers;
(C2) Receiver segments served by each platform are of equal size;
(C3) The receiver side singlehomes.
The complementarity assumption (CA) and condition C1 merely serve to charac-
terize this particular industry setup and constitute the \Maintained Assumption."
C1 is relaxed by focussing on variable production ratio's, see Subsection 3.3 be-
low. Conditions C2 and C3 are additional assumptions made out of convenience:
C2 substantially facilitates calculations, and C3 is a possible explanation for each
platform's local monopoly over the receivers it serves (perfect segmentation). C3
states that a receiver makes a single discrete choice, which is perfectly rational in
the present setting as argued above.
The complementarity assumption (CA) induces full multihoming on the sender
side of the market: senders require the provision of services by all n platforms,
entailing a total fee A 
P
i pS
i , where pS
i  0 denotes the sender fee charged
by platform i. As such, sender quasi-demand for the bundle of platform services
becomes a function of the total fee charged and is dened as
D
















= 1   GS(A). Obviously, demand is zero for all
A   bS. It follows from the denition of gS that sender quasi-demand is a decreasing
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=  gS(A) < 0:
To guarantee the existence and uniqueness of an optimum we additionally impose








As can be seen from (1), sender quasi-demand DS is the same for all platforms
due to the complementarity assumption. Also, from the point of view of the senders,
an implicit assumption is that the successful completion of a transaction requires
the platforms to be combined in the bundle in a 1:1 ratio, i.e., each platform is only
needed once in the interaction with the receivers on the other side of the market.
At rst sight the multihoming characteristic of the sender side of the market
seems to have important consequences for the quasi-demand structure on the receiver
side as demand for platform i's services becomes a function of all the platforms'
prices charged to receivers (see Rochet and Tirole, 2003). In this case, let pR 2 Rn
+
be the vector of receiver prices. Then the fraction of receivers choosing platform i





























.10 As receivers only
need acces to a single platform to complete a transaction with any of the senders on
the other side of the market, it is plausible to assume that they will singlehome.
The complementarity assumption however induces perfect segmentation on the
receiver side of the market to the extent that each platform exclusively serves its
own segment. In fact, complementarity and perfect segmentation are two sides of
the same coin, as illustrated extensively in Section 2. As a consequence, receiver
quasi-demand is a function of the own price only and is dened as
D
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. Similar to sender quasi-demand,
we require DR




















10Note that this is equivalent to a discrete choice model where a receiver chooses the platform
that maximizes utility, see e.g. Anderson and G abszewicz (2005).
13Common to the literature on standard two-sided markets, the utility a receiver
derives from the services delivered by platform i is increasing in the number of cross-
market participants, i.e. the senders. It is equal to the net benet from a transaction,
bR
i   pR

















, the complementary feature
of the market entails an expression for the utility that senders derive from the services
delivered by the bundle of platforms that is quite dierent from the standard case: it
is equal to the net benet from a transaction, bS  A, times the number of receivers,
















Given (1) and (3), and assuming independence between sender and receiver ben-


























Assuming for simplicity that platforms incur a constant marginal cost c = 0 per























Additionally, assume that it is costless to produce the composite good, i.e., the
bundle of platform services. Imposing log-concavity on receiver and sender quasi-
demand ensures that the rst-order conditions for program (4) are both necessary
and sucient for a maximum: as log-concavity is preserved under multiplication and
positive scaling (see Boyd and V andenberghe, 2004, pp. 105{106), i becomes log-
concave and its unique maximum is found by dierentiating with respect to receiver
and sender prices. For ease of notation, let subscript I henceforth denote actions
taken by independent platforms, and let    bR   bS. It now becomes possible to
prove the following proposition:
11Exogenously xing the number of potential transactions in the market at N, platform i's total






DS(A). F or simplicity we normalize N to 1.











2 bS   bR
2n + 1
(6)
and make pro ts equal to
I =
 
n bR + bS3
(2n + 1)3 : (7)














2 bS   bR
2n + 1
(9)
I = nI =
n
 
n bR + bS3
(2n + 1)3 : (10)




























































Zero conjectural variations (2) imply that we obtain a system of 2n equations in 2n






























i )]0 =  
DS(A)
[DS(A)]0; (15)
which replicates the result of Rochet and Tirole (2003): when platforms set prices
15pR
i and pS
i to maximize volume for a given total price pi = pR
i + pS
i , the volume
impact of a small variation in prices has to be the same on both sides, keeping in
mind that here the volume impact on the sender side is triggered by a change in the







































Then, under perfect segmentation and assuming equal supports of the distribution
of receiver benets, meaning b
R
i = b
R and  bR
i =  bR 8i, we obtain in a symmet-















is symmetric), the system of best-response functions above can
be simplied and written in matrix notation as
"
2 1













Notice we have used a uniform distribution of receiver and sender benets to obtain




k = R ;S , yields the desired results. 
For n = 2, com p etition is ch aracterized by a d u op oly. T h e in d u stry con  gu ration
for tw o com p lem entary p latform s u n d er B ertran d p rice com p etition is sh ow n in
Figu re 6.










2 bS   bR
5
(17)
12Log-concave quasi-demand functions are easily obtained from a uniform distribution of benets
w ith , resp ectively, p robability density and cumulative distribution function gk(x) = 1= bk and
Gk(x) = x= bk for k = R ;S . Q uasi-demand th en follow s from th e denition Dk(x) := P robfbk 
xg = 1   Gk(x) = ( bk   x)= bk and is decreasing and log-concave in its argument: dDk(x)=dx =
 1= bk < 0 and d2[lnDk(x)]=dx2 =  1=( bk   x)2 < 0. A s such , th e quasi-demand function
in models of tw o-sided markets is th e equivalent of th e so-called reliability or survival function
 G() = 1 G() commonly used in reliability th eory, see e.g. B agnoli and B ergstrom (2005, S ection
3). A dditionally, th e use of uniform distributions avoids corner solutions arising from skew ed
p ricing distributions, see e.g. B olt and T ieman (2004, 2006).
16Figure 6: Industry conguration for n = 2 (Bertrand pricing)
Receivers P latform 1 S en d er















2 bR + bS3
125
: (18)
A rst important result| from a welfare point of view| is that, unlike the C our-
not-E llet complementary monopoly theory (see C orollary 4), the bundle price as set
by independent complementary platforms does not approach the senders' \choke"
level in the limit as the number of components (platforms) approaches innity:
Corollary 2 (Bundle L imit P rice in Two-S ided M arkets). A s the number of plat-
forms grow s to innity, the bundle price does not attain the upper bound imposed by
the sender choke level  bS.




2n+ 1 = 2 bS  bR
2 , where the last equality follows from de
l'H ^ opital's rule. Because  bS   1
2
 bR   bS, this limit value is smaller than the sender
choke level. 
The presence of the receiver side thus acts as a counterweight that limits the
upward pressure on the bundle price exerted by an increasing number of components
(platforms). The reason that the choke level is never reached in two-sided markets
is that it is not benecial for platforms to do so: pushing the price on one side to its
choke level would e ectively kill o all quasi-demand on that side and hence prots
given the \multiplicative" nature of revenues (and prot function).
3.2 Com p lem en tary P latform s: J oin t O w n ersh ip
S uppose now that the platforms are owned by a single entity which sets the price of
the bundle, A 
P
i pS
i , on the sender side and the receiver prices, pR
i , on the other
























W ith subscript J referring to the actions taken by the joint entity, we can now state
the following:
Proposition 2 (Complementary Platforms: Joint O wnership). Under joint owner-










2 bS   n bR
3n
(20)
and make prots equal to
J =
 
n bR + bS3
27n2
: (21)














2 bS   n bR
3n
(23)
J = nJ =
 
n bR + bS3
27n
: (24)
Proof. The rst-order conditions with respect to receiver prices are identical to the









































































































































































































Applying Cramer's rule, pk
J =
jAkj
jAj for k = R ;S , yields the desired results. 
As can be seen from equation (26), the major dierence with the results under
















in the rst-order condition with respect to the individual sender prices. It is exactly
this which allows us to state the following proposition, extending the anticommons
problem to two-sided markets:
Proposition 3 (The Anticommons Problem in Two-Sided Markets). Compared with
independent complementary platforms, under joint ownership platforms set receiver
and sender prices such that
(i) the price level is lower:
pJ < pI; (28)












(iii) platform and industry prots are higher:
J > I (32)
J > I: (33)
Proof. By comparison of the results in Propositions 1 and 2. 
As in the classic anticommons result, independent platforms charge too high a
sender price, exerting a negative pricing externality on the other platforms. As a
result, sender quasi-demand for the bundle of platform services decreases. Being a
two-sided market, this increase in sender pricers is oset by a decrease in receiver
prices. This decrease however fails to compensate for the losses incurred on the
sender side, causing individual and industry prots to decrease.
Similar to a multi-product monopoly (see Tirole, 1988, pp. 69{72), complemen-
tary platforms under joint ownership internalize negative pricing externalities, charg-
ing lower sender prices so as to decrease the bundle price [see equation (30)], thereby
increasing sender quasi-demand. The two-sidedness of the market is mirrored how-
ever by higher receiver prices, as indicated by the price structure [see equations (29)
and (31)]. Contrary to the previous situation, the gains on the sender side now
outweigh the losses on the receiver side.13 This result resembles the topsy-turvy
principle of platform pricing in standard two-sided markets (R ochet and Tirole,
2006): an exogenous factor that leads to higher prices (and higher margins) on one
side of the market (the receiver side), induces platforms to lower prices on the other
side of the market (the sender side) since increasing volume on that side now be-
comes more protable. The exogenous factor that increases the receiver prices here
is the change in industry structure as platforms evolve from independent entities to
subsidiaries under a single entity.
Summarizing, a lower price level pJ combined with higher platform prots J
entails that welfare in this particular industry decreases with the number of in-
dependent platforms and that Cournot's complementary monopoly theory extends
13Note that for n = 1, prices and prots are the same under both ownership structures.
20to two-sided markets. Consequently, mergers between such agents are not to be
discouraged from an antitrust point of view, a result already hinted at in Subsec-
tion 2.1.14
3.3 Variable Production Ratio
In this subsection we drop the implicit assumption that platforms are only needed
once in the \production" of the composite good. A s such, let ai denote the number
of times platform i is needed in composing the bundle of platform services required
by a sender to successfully interact with receivers. T he production ratio between





























i (A)  aiD
S(A)
sender quasi-demand for each of the individual components. W e can then write






































which independent platforms tend to maximize when setting receiver and sender
prices, allowing us to state the following proposition:





i an d  =
P
i ai, in depen den t com plem en -
14To be precise, a potential measure of welfare can be dened as the unweighted (utilitarian)
sum of (i) receivers' surplus, (ii) senders' surplus, and (iii) industry prots, or
Wk = C S R
k + C S S
k + k;
for k = I;J . The extent to which welfare increases under joint ownership is then the di erence
W = WJ  WI. A s both senders' surplus and industry prots increase (C S S = C S S
J  C S S
I >
0; = J   I > 0), this will ultimately depend on the redistribution of surplus from receivers
(C S R = C S R
J   C S R
I < 0) to the latter, or W > 0 if C S S +  >  C S R.
21tary platforms, needed in a production ratio ai :aj for the successful completion of a










2 bS    bR
 + 2
; (35)




 bR + bS3
( + 2)3
; (36)
w ith pro ts distributed according to ai.

































































































































































i and  =
P
i ai. Then, noting that A =
P
i aipS = pS, we
obtain the following system of equations:
"
2 1













Obtaining a solution for pk
I (k = R ;S ) then is a straightforward application of
Cramer's R ule. 
Similarly, under joint ownership a single entity sets receiver and sender prices so

























i ai)2 and  =
P
i ai, under joint owner-
ship complementary platforms needed in a production ratio ai :aj for the successful










2 bS    bR
2 + 
; (38)




 bR + bS3
(2 + )3
; (39)
with prots distributed according to ai.
Proof. B y the same token, the rst-order conditions with respect to sender prices






































































i ai)2 and  =
P
i ai. In this case we obtain the system of
equations "
2 1













and a solution for pk
J (k = R;S) is found using Cramer's Rule. 
It is clear that should ai = 18i (entailing  = 1 and ; = n), this variable
production ratio model reduces to the 1:1 production ratio (\perfect complements")
case discussed in the previous subsections.
4 On the Two-Sidedness of Complements
As mentioned in Subsection 2.3, in reality bundles exist that simultaneously combine
two-sided (platforms) with one-sided components (traditional rms). We refer to
these as asymmetric bundles, with the term \symmetry" pointing to the unique
presence of components of a specic type, either one- or two-sided. This evidently
calls for a reinterpretation of the number of platforms n. Therefore, redene n as
the total number of components present in the bundle, and respectively denote by
n1 and n2 the number of one- and two-sided components, yielding
n  n1 + n2:
This denition allows for a variety of bundle types, with extreme cases being sym-
metric compositions of either one-sided components (n1 = n;n2 = 0), or two-sided
components (n1 = 0;n2 = n). Any combination in between is an \asymmetric"
bundle (n1;n2 < n and n1 + n2 = n). As the symmetric two-sided case has been
treated by P ropositions 1, 2 and 3, we focus attention on the remaining symmetric
24and asymmetric cases.
M aintaining the implicit assumption that components are used in a 1:1 ratio for
a successful completion of a transaction, the bundle price A in this more general a












With demand for the bundle still a function of the bundle price, two cases remain
to be analyzed: (1) the pricing of symmetric one-sided bundles, and (2) the pricing
of asymmetric bundles. With respect to the latter, we investigate the e ect of the
number of one- and two-sided components present in the bundle (i.e. the fraction
n1
n2) on the limiting price of the bundle itself.
4.1 Symmetric One-Sided Bundles: Complementary Mono-
poly
With n1 = 0;n2 = n and following E conomides and Salop (1992), DS denotes de-
mand for the bundle composed of n1 one-sided complementary goods, and produced
by rms 1 to n1, each having a monopoly on the production of their respective com-
ponent. For ease of exposition, assume that n1 = 2. The dening feature of the
complementary monopoly setting is that both monopolists face the same demand,





h  0 is the price charged for complement h = 1;2.
Assuming for simplicity that each good is produced at constant marginal cost



































































Now, suppose that both complements are produced by a single entity which sets










































































Note that this result holds regardless the number of one-sided components. There-
fore we can state the following:
Corollary 3 (Complementary Monopoly). For a bundle exclusively consisting of
one-sided components (n1 = n;n2 = 0), the two-sided complementary monopoly
result stated in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 leads to the complementary monopoly result
(C ournot, 1838, 1971) for one-sided markets.
Proof. Comparing (40) and (41), we nd that A > A. It follows that the price
for the bundle under complementary monopoly is twice (n1 times) as large as under
15Alternatively, taking the FOC with respect to the bundle price A immediately yields the same
result.
26integrated complementary monopoly, thus replicating Cournot's anticommons result
for a one-sided market. 
What explains for this remarkable result? As stated by D ari-Mattiacci and Parisi
(2006), any producer increasing the price of his component exerts a negative exter-
nality on the producers of the remaining complementary goods because demand
for the composite good DS decreases. This seller reaps the full benet of his price
increase in additional revenue but bears only part of the associated cost, which
is the corresponding reduction in the quantity demanded. An integrated comple-
mentary monopolist, bearing the full cost of such price increases, internalizes the
negative externality and sets a lower, prot-maximizing bundle price. As such, this
is the horizontal equivalent of vertical integration to avoid the problem of double
marginalization (Spengler, 1950).






















(ii) In the limit the bundle price as set by independent components approaches the
choke level, while under joint ownership it attains half the choke level.
Proof. (i) U nder symmetry, equations (42) and (43) follow directly from (40) and
(41); (ii) As the number of one-sided components approaches innity, we have re-
spectively limn1!1 AI = limn1!1
n1 bS






4.2 A symmetric Bundles
This subsection details the analysis of price-setting behavior in markets where plat-
forms team up with one-sided rms| referred to as components| to create a bundle
which senders need to consume as a whole to successfully interact with cross-market
agents (see Subsection 2.3). From a methodological point of view, we apply the
27blueprint developed in Section 3 to derive prices and prots, and emphasize the role
played by the number of one- and two-sided components in this particular industry
setup.16








h is the sender fee charged by one-sided components, and pS
i the platforms'
sender fees. Just as in the standard one-sided complementary monopoly setting (see
Subsection 4.1), transaction volume for the components is equal to the demand for
the entire bundle, DS(A). With cC
h and ci respectively denoting the components' and
the platforms' marginal costs per transaction, the prot function for the components
































Next, assume that ci = c  0 (i.e., platforms are symmetric), and that cC
h = c with
 2 [0;1]. For example, with  = 1, components incur the same marginal cost per
transaction as do the platforms. For simplicity we again assume that c = 0.
Proposition 6 (Asymmetric Bundles). In asymmetric bundles composed of n1 one-




(n1 + n2 + 1) bR   bS





2 bS   (n1 + 1) bR





n2 bR + bS3
(n1 + 2n2 + 1)3; (47)
16We do not focus on prices under dierent ownership structures here as it is easy to see that the
analysis of (i) mergers between two-sided components only where a single entity sets platform prices
on both sides of the market is a simple extension of the results found in S ubsections 3.1 and 3.2,
(ii) mergers between one-sided components only hinges on the classic Cournot (one-sided) com-
plementary monopoly result, see S ubsection 4.1, and (iii) mergers between one- and two-sided
components where a single entity sets all prices, in particular the bundle price, combines elements
from both (i) and (ii).




n2 bR + bS






n2 bR + bS2
 bS(n1 + 2n2 + 1)2: (49)
The bundle price equals
AI =
(n1 + 2n2) bS   n2 bR
n1 + 2n2 + 1
: (50)
Proof. As platforms individually set prices to maximize prots, we again obtain the



















































































































































which, when invoking symmetry (pC
























1 n2 + 1 n1






















The application of Cramer's Rule, pk
I =
jAkj
jAj for k 2 f R;S;C g, gives the desired
results. 
A closer look reveals that this general result encompasses both symmetric cases:
for n1 = 0 and n2 = n, the asymmetric model replicates results (5) and (6) for
receiver and sender prices set by independent complementary platforms. For n1 = n
and n2 = 0, the asymmetric model yields (42), the price for one-sided components.
A nal result following from equation (50) is that the two-sided characteristic
of the market tends to disappear as the number of one-sided components grows
large. Despite the presence of platforms, the market behaves as if it were one-
sided when the number of one-sided components approaches innity. On the other
hand, if the number of platforms approaches innity, the one-sided components
become relatively unimportant and the market tends to a two-sided market with
complementary platforms.
Corollary 5 (Asymmetric Bundle Limit Prices). (i) If the number of one-sided
components approaches innity the bundle price approaches the senders' choke level,
replicating the Cournot-E llet complementary monopoly result of Corollary 4; (ii)
30if the number of two-sided components grows large, the bundle price does not ap-
proach the senders' choke level and replicates the complementary platform result
from Corollary 2.
Proof. (i) In this case we have limn1!1 AI = limn1!1
(n1+ 2n2) bS n2 bR
n1+ 2n2+ 1 =
n1 bS
n1 =  bS;
(ii) H ere w e h ave th at limn2!1 AI = limn2!1
(n1+ 2n2) bS n2 bR
n1+ 2n2+ 1 =
2n2 bS n2 bR





W e introd u ced a mod el th at allow s for th e investigation of p ricin g d ecision s by
comp lementary p latforms, exten d in g C ou rn ot's anticommon s p rob lem to tw o-sid ed
markets. A t th e same time, th is settin g o ers a n atu ral exp lan ation for asymmetric
sin gle- an d mu ltih omin g p attern s across th e market.
W e sh ow th at w elfare in markets ch aracterized by th e p resen ce of in d ep en d ent
comp lementary p latforms is low er th an w ith comp lementary p latforms u n d er joint
ow n ersh ip , as th e total fee ch arged is h igh er an d p latform an d in d u stry p ro ts are
low er. S imilar to th e anticommon s p rob lem in trad ition al on e-sid ed markets, th is
resu lt arises b ecau se in d ep en d ent p latforms fail to intern alize th e n egative p ricin g ex-
tern ality th ey exert on oth ers. U n d er joint ow n ersh ip , p latforms ch arge low er sen d er
p rices (an d th erefore a low er b u n d le p rice) an d corresp on d in gly make h igh er p ro ts.
T h e tw o-sid ed n ess of th e market h ow ever also in d u ces th e ch argin g of h igh er receiver
p rices, thu s creatin g b oth \w in n ers" an d \losers" at th e same time. H ow ever, th e
gain s realized by th e sen d ers an d th e in crease in p ro ts mad e by th e p latforms allow
for th e comp en sation of th e losses in cu rred on th e receiver sid e. C onversely, th e ad -
verse e ects of th e d ilu tion of p rop erty rights on equ ilib riu m p ricin g are mitigated
vis- a-vis th e case w h ere on ly on e sid e of th e market is p resent.
F in ally, w e also sh ow th at b oth th e comp lementary p latform th eorem an d th e
C ou rn ot-E llet comp lementary mon op oly resu lt arise as sp ecial cases of a gen eral
settin g w h ere b u n d les con sist of b oth on e- an d tw o-sid ed comp on ents. G iven th e
many p rob lems in econ omics th at arise from cu ltu ral or b iological comp lementarity,
also often en forced legally, as w ell as th e p resen ce of n etw ork extern alities, w e are
con  d ent th at th e p resent resu lts w ill contrib u te to a b etter econ omic u n d erstan d in g
of some law s govern in g th e interaction b etw een in d ivid u als over p latforms.
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